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ARGUMENT
I.

POINTS OF LAW AND FACTS OVERLOOKED BY UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS

On July 12, 2007, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision
affirming the trial court's decision. See Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT. App. 246, Case No.
20060290-CA (July 12, 2007)(Appendix 1). In the memorandum decision, the Utah Court
of Appeals stated, "[t]he only final order associated with the stipulated property settlement
thai was entered within thirty days of Mr. Johnson's March 23, 2006 notice of appeal was
the order entitled 'Order, In Re: January 23,2006 Hearing.'" Appellant respectfully asks the
Utah Court of Appeals to reconsider this position based upon the facts and points of law set
forth below.
A. The Memorandum Decision Overlooks Two Orders Signed within Thirty Days
of the Notice of Appeal
The memorandum decision issued by the court of appeals reviewed the order signed
by the district court on February 27,2006. However, on February 23,2006, the district court
entered two orders entitled "Ruling and Order: Re Respondent's Objection to Newly
Prepared Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed" (R. 1731 -173 5) and on the same date, the district
court entered "Ruling Re: Order to Show Cause." (R. 1737-1741). Using the court of
appeals legal analysis regarding final orders, the memorandum decision should have
addressed these two orders issued by the trial court on February 23, 2006. Those orders
were issued twenty eight (28) days before the notice of appeal was filed on March 23,2006.
Therefore, the memorandum decision incorrectly addresses only the order issued on February
1

27, 2006 and ignores the orders issued by the district court on February 23,2006. Because
the two orders issued on February 23, 2006 were issued twenty eight days before the notice
of appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals should address the issued briefed regarding those two
orders.
Specifically, the two orders issued by the district court on February 23, 2006 pertain
to the trust deed and trust deed note and the authority of the district court to issue contempt
orders when the parties agreed to use a trust deed and trust deed note. The issues presented
for review as set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, which were within the thirty day time
period, are as follows:
1. Did the lack of essential contract terms regarding the trust deed and
trust deed note and the number of parcels to be transferred make the stipulated
Amended Decree of Divorce ambiguous and/or unenforceable?
2. Did the modifications of the trust deed and trust deed note by the
Court, without the consent of Mr. Johnson, make the stipulated Amended
Decree of Divorce ambiguous and/or unenforceable?
3. Wasv the stipulated

Amended Decree of Divorce

ambiguous and/or unenforceable because the parties failed to
have a meeting of the minds on the integral features of how
many parcels were going to be deeded to Mrs. Johnson and the
terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note?

2

4. Was the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce ambiguous and/or
unenforceable because it lacked sufficient definiteness to be enforced?
5. Was the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce ambiguous and/or
unenforceable because it lacked sufficient definiteness to be enforced?
6. Is the use of contempt proceedings barred by the one-action rule in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 where the parties agreed in the stipulated Amended
Decree of Divorce that a trust deed and trust deed note would secure the
property settlement?
7. Does the use of contempt proceedings violate article I, section 16 of
the Utah Constitution where the contempt proceedings are used to enforce a
property settlement secured by a trust deed and trust deed note, where the
property settlement does not involve either alimony payments or child support
payments?
8. Is the use of contempt proceedings prior to July 1,2006 appropriate
when the parties agreed in the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce that a
balloon payment on July 1, 2006 would.be used to pay for any outstanding
payments under the Amended Decree of Divorce?
9. Was it erroneous for Judge Howard to award a judgment to Mrs.
Johnson in the amount of $223,982.97 for monthly payments under the
stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce when two parcels of property had been
inadvertently deeded to Mrs. Johnson, where the value of the property far
3

exceeded the amount owing and where the monthly payments had been
secured by a trust deed and trust deed note and the parties had stipulated to a
balloon payment in July 2006 for any past due payments.
On rehearing, the Utah Court of Appeals should address these issues as briefed by the
parties and submitted to the court. The two orders filed by the district court on February 23,
2006 were clearly within the thirty day time period required by the rules.
B. The Memorandum Decision Encourages Piecemeal Appeals
The memorandum decision encourages parties to file piecemeal appeals in
contradiction to existing Utah precedent. The memorandum decision addresses the order
dated February 27,2006 and ignores the several other pertinent orders entered by the district
court, none of which disposed of the entire matter below. As stated above, even if the court
chooses to treat all of the orders appealed as final orders, at a minimum the court should reexamine the two orders issued on February 23, 2006, as they were signed twenty eight days
before the notice of appeal. However, the court should re-examine all of the orders appealed
by Mr. Johnson because none of the orders constituted final orders until the last order of
February 27, 2006 was signed by the district court.
For an order or judgment to be final, it must dispose of the subject-matter of the
litigation on the merits of the case and end the controversy between the litigants. Kennedy
v. New Era Indus., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). None of the orders entered before the
February 27,2006 order entered by the district court disposed of the proceeding or ended the
controversy between the litigants. There still remained issued to be decided and pending
4

matters were before the court. Based upon the position set forth in the memorandum
decision, Mr. Johnson would have been required to file a notice of appeal after each order
was signed by the district court. This would require at least three notices of appeal and
would fly in the face of many prior decisions issued by the Utah Supreme court not to file
piecemeal appeals. See Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, LLC, 123 P.2d 393, 396 (Utah
2005)(the principal rationale for limiting the right to appeal in this way is to promote judicial
economy by preventing piecemeal appeals in the same litigation to this Court); Loffredo v.
Holt, 37 P.3d 1070, 1072 (Utah 200l)(final judgment rule prevents appellate courts from
having to deal with piecemeal appeals in the same litigation); Promax Development v. Raile,
998 P.2d 254,259 (Utah 2000)(amount of attorney's fees must be decided prior to appeal to
enable an appellant to appeal all issues in a single notice of appeal). 1
II. Conclusion
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests the court to reconsider the opinion set forth in the
memorandum decision issued on July 12, 2007. The opinion overlooked the two orders issued on
February 23,2006 and also overlooked Utah precedent regarding piecemeal appeals. Therefore, the
Utah Court of Appeals should reconsider all of the issues briefed by the parties. Counsel for Mr.
Johnson hereby certifies that the petition for rehearing is submitted in good faith and not for delay
as required by Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

]

]n fact, Appellee's brief in opposition argues that none of the orders constitute final
orders and is in direct contradiction of the position taken by the Utah Court of Appeals in the
memorandum decision. Appellant responded to this argument in Appellant's Reply Brief.
5

DATED this
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</-(/ day of July, 2007.
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on this
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JUL 12 2007
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Ina Marie Johnson,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Petitioner and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20060290-CA
F I L E D
( J u l y 12, 2007)

Neldon Paul Johnson,
Respondent and Appellant.

2 0 0 7 UT App 2 4 6

Fourth District, Provo Department, 004401468
The Honorable Fred D. Howard
Attorneys:

Denver C. Snuffer Jr., Sandy, for Appellant
Rosemond G. Blakelock, Provo, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, McHugh, and Thorne.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Neldon Paul Johnson and Ina Marie Johnson were divorced on
June 6, 2 001, and the terms of their stipulated property
settlement were included in an Amended Decree of Divorce entered
on June 27, 2 001. Mr. Johnson now attempts to appeal a variety
of the trial court's decisions related to the stipulated property
settlement.
The only final order associated with the stipulated property
settlement that was entered within thirty days of Mr. Johnson's
March 23, 2006 notice of appeal was the order entitled "Order, In
Re: January 23, 2006 Hearing." Mr. Johnson did not specifically
designate this order on his notice of appeal, but instead
designated a document entitled "Order on Ruling Re: Respondent's
Objection to Order Regarding the January 23, 2006 Hearing signed
February 27, 2006." No such document bears that precise caption.
Although not ideal, Mr. Johnson's description was sufficient to
give notice of the order Mr. Johnson intended to appeal as it
generally describes the order and it accurately bears the date of
the order. See In re B.B., 2002 UT App 82,^10, 45 P.3d 527
(holding that a notice of appeal designating only one of two
orders intended to be appealed, while not "ideal," was sufficient
to notify the opposing party "particularly where the orders bore
the same date").

The Order In Re: January 23,. 2006 Hearing presents three
issues for appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in using
contempt proceedings in response to Mr. Johnson's failure to
make payments required under the Amended Decree of Divorce;
(2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to set off a
judgment for past-due payments by the value of "additional"
properties deeded to Ms. Johnson; and (3) whether the trial court
clearly abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to Ms.
Johnson in a particular amount.
I.

Failure to Make Payments

Mr. Johnson claims that the trial court erred by using
contempt proceedings as the mechanism for ensuring his compliance
in making payments required under the Amended Decree of Divorce,
which payments were secured b w a trust deed. Mr : Johnson aroues
that, in the event of his failure to pay, the "one-action rule"
requires Ms. Johnson, the secured party under the trust deed, to
foreclose on the trust deed prior to pursuing a judgment against
him or subsequently pursuing contempt proceedings to prompt
compliance with such judgment. "The issue is one of law, which
this court reviews under a correction-of-error standard, without
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." Sanders v.
Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 1992).
The one-action rule "prevent[s] a creditor from 'suing the
debtor personally on [a trust deed] note until it first
forecloses against the real property.'" Machock v. Fink, 2006 UT
30,^12, 137 P.3d 779 (quoting City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 815
P. 2d 234, 236 (Utah 1991)) . However, "' [w]here the security has
been lost through no fault of the [creditor] , an action may be
maintained directly upon the personal obligation evidenced by the
note without going through the idle and fruitless procedure of
foreclosure.'" City Consumer Servs., 815 P.2d at 236 (quoting
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 14 53, 8 8. Utah 577, 56
P.2d 1046, 1049 (1936)). Where such is the case, "the one-action
rule does not apply," id. at 237, and creditors "are . . . not
limited in pursuing their full claim'against [the debtor]
personally," Sanders, 838 P.2d at 1136.
Given the trial court's finding that the property pledged as
security under the trust deed had been "pillaged" by Mr. Johnson,
it did not err in concluding that the one-action rule did not
apply and that Ms. Johnson was free to pursue a judgment against
Mr. Johnson personally for past-due payments. Furthermore, when
Mr. Johnson refused to comply with the judgment for past-due
payments, it was well within the trial court's discretion to use
contempt proceedings as a means of effectuating compliance with
its judgment and orders. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(5) (2002)
("Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the
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court . . . [is] contempt [] of the authority of the court
. . . . " ) ; Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44,1(39, 100 P.3d 1151
(noting that "a trial court's exercise of its contempt power" is
reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard).
II.

Set-off for "Additional" Properties

Mr. Johnson claims that the trial court erred m denying him
a set-off against the judgment for late payments in the amount
representing the value of two "additional" parcels he
"inadvertently" deeded to Ms. Johnson. In reviewing the record,
it is evident that the trial court denied Mr. Johnson's request
for a set-off based on a factual finding that Mr. Johnson had not
given Ms. Johnson any additional property, but instead, had given
her exactly what the Amended Decree of Divorce had ordered him to
give .
On appeal, Mr. Johnson fails to marshal the evidence
supporting the trial court's factual finding, see Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9), and likewise fails to "ferret out a fatal flaw m the
evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,
1315 (Utah 1991). In light of this failure, "'we assume[] that
the record supports the finding [] ' . . . and conclude the finding
was not clearly erroneous." Harris v. IES Assocs., 2003 UT App
112,^32, 69 P.3d 297 (alterations in original) (quoting Heber
City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997)).
III.

Attorney Fees for January 2006 Hearing

Mr. Johnson contends that the award of attorney fees for the
January 23, 2006 hearing was unreasonable, asserting that the
award was excessive in amount and included fees for work
unrelated to that specific hearing. "[A] trial court has 'broad
discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and
we will consider that determination against an abuse-ofdiscretion standard.'" Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,^127, 130
P.3d 325 (quoting Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 99L
(Utah 1988)) . Thus, "' [t]he standard of review on appeal of [the
amount of] a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error
or clear abuse of discretion.'" Id. (second alteration in
original) (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316
(Utah 1998)).
We conclude that the trial court did not commit patent error
or clearly abuse its discretion in determining the amount of the
award for attorney fees associated with the January 23, 2006
hearing. Mr. Johnson provides no specific explanation as to why
the court clearly erred in finding fees incurred in prior years
related to the January 2006 hearing. The post-decree enforcement
issues resolved in the January 2 006 hearing appear to have been
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continuously litigated over the course of several years. It was
therefore not unreasonable for the trial court to determine that
fees listed in Ms. Johnson's counsel's affidavit, even those from
prior years, were necessary to prepare for the January 2006
hearing.
We therefore affirm the trial court's decisions regarding
the hearing on January 23, 2006. Because Ms. Johnson was awarded
attorney fees below, and because she has prevailed on appeal, she
is entitled to recover her fees on appeal. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-3(2) (Supp. 2006) ("In any action to enforce an order of
. . . division of property in a domestic case, the court may
award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense."); Lyngle v.
Lyngie, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Generally,
when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the
party who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also
be awarded to that party on appeal."); Maughan v. Maughan, 770
P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (acknowledging that Utah Code
section 30-3-3 creates a statutory basis for awarding attorney
fees to a prevailing party in a domestic case on appeal).
Accordingly, we remand for a determination of those attorney fees
that Ms. Johnson reasonably incurred on appeal.

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

CarolynvB. McHugh, J u d g e ^

William A. Thorne, Judge,
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